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Abstract
For a binary choice problem, the spatial coordination of decisions in an agent com-
munity is investigated both analytically and by means of stochastic computer simu-
lations. The individual decisions are based on different local information generated
by the agents with a finite lifetime and disseminated in the system with a finite ve-
locity. We derive critical parameters for the emergence of minorities and majorities
of agents making opposite decisions and investigate their spatial organization. We
find that dependent on two essential parameters describing the local impact and the
spatial dissemination of information, either a definite stable minority/majority re-
lation (single-attractor regime) or a broad range of possible values (multi-attractor
regime) occurs. In the latter case, the outcome of the decision process becomes
rather diverse and hard to predict, both with respect to the share of the majority
and their spatial distribution. We further investigate how a dissemination of infor-
mation on different time scales affects the outcome of the decision process. We find
that a more “efficient” information exchange within a subpopulation provides a suit-
able way to stabilize their majority status and to reduce “diversity” and uncertainty
in the decision process.
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1 Introduction
Decision making is one of the fundamental processes in economy but also
in social systems. If these systems consist of many interacting elements –
which we call agents here – the system dynamics may be described on two
different levels: the microscopic level, where the decisions of the individual
agents occur and the macroscopic level where a certain collective behavior
can be observed. To find a link between these two levels remains one of the
challenges of complex systems theory not only with respect to socio-economic
systems [1, 9, 32, 37, 44].
Among the various factors that may influence the decision of agents we men-
tion the information available on a particular subject – such as the price or
the quality of a particular product, in an economic context, or the benefits
and harms that might result from the decision, in a social context, but also
information about the decisions of others. A somehow extreme example is
given by the rational agent model, one of the standard paradigms of neoclas-
sical economic theory. It is based on the assumption of the agent’s complete
knowledge of all possible actions and their outcomes or a known probability
distribution over outcomes, and the common knowledge assumption, i.e. that
the agent knows that all other agents know exactly what he/she knows and
are equally rational [39].
This implecitely requires an infinitely fast, loss-free and error-free dissemina-
tion of information in the whole system. A more realistic assumption would
be based on the bounded rationality of agents, where decisions are not taken
upon complete a priori information, but on incomplete, limited knowledge
distributed with finite velocity. This however would require to model the in-
formation flow between the agents explicitely. A possibile approach to this
problem is given by the spatio-temporal communication field [34, 38], that is
also used in this paper (cf. Sect. 2).
Based on incomplete information, how does an agent make her decision on a
particular subject? The “rational” agent usually calculates her private utility
and tries to maximize it. Besides the methodological complications involved
e.g. in the definitions of the utility functions (that sometimes may anticipate
the results observed in computer simulations), it turns out in a world of un-
certainty that the maximization of private utilities can be only achieved by
some supplemented strategies.
In order to reduce the risk of making the wrong decision, it often seems to be
appropriate just to copy the decisions of others. Such an imitation strategy
is widely found in biology, but also in cultural evolution. Different species
including humans imitate the behavior of others of their species to become
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successful or just to adapt to an existing community [5]. A physically visible
example of such an imitation strategy is the formation of trails commonly
created among humans, hoofed animals or social insects. Very similar to the
model discussed in the present paper, this can be simulated in an agent model
based on a non-linear positive feedback between the agents, where sometimes
different kind of information is involved [12, 35].
But imitation strategies are also most powerful in economic systems, where
late entrants quite often size markets from pioneers [31]. While the latter ones
are forced to spend heavily on both product and market development, imita-
tors can often profit from an already existing market, while avoiding the risk
of making costly mistakes. In the case, where agents can observe the payoffs
generated by other agents, information contagion [2] has been presented as
an explanation for particular patterns of macrobehavior in economic systems,
for example path-dependence and lock-in-effects [21, 43]. This has been also
simulated within the concept of social percolation [41, 45], which may explain
the occurrence of extreme market shares, based on positive feedback processes
between adaptive economic agents.
Information contagion however involves the transmission of two different infor-
mation, the decision made by an agent and the payoff received. The situation
becomes different when agents only observe the choices of other agents and
tend to imitate them, without complete information about the possible conse-
quences of their choices. This is commonly denoted as herding behavior which
plays a considerable role in economic systems [3, 19], in particular in financial
markets [25], but also in human and biological systems where panic can be
observed [11].
In social systems, herding behavior may result from the many (internal or
external) interdepencencies of an agent community that push or pull the in-
dividual decision into a certain direction, such as peer pressure or external
influences. The social impact theory [22, 28] that intends to describe the tran-
sition from “private attitude to public opinion” has covered some these col-
lective effects in a way that can be also formalized within a physical approach
[15, 20, 24].
One of the modelling impacts of the social impact theory was the “rediscov-
ering of physical space” in sociology, i.e. distance matters for social influence
[13, 23, 27]. Hence, instead of mean-field approaches where all actions of agents
are coupled via a mean field, spatial models become of increasing interest. In
addition to the question of how individual decisions of agents may affect the
macrobehavior of the system, now the question becomes important how these
desisions may organize themselves in space, i.e. what kind of spatial patterns
may be observed on the global level.
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The most commonly “spatial” model used is based on the cellular automaton
approach, i.e. each agent occupies a lattice site. Often the lattice is also fully
covered by agents, i.e. there is a homogeneous distribution in “space”. As a
third assumtion mostly used, only nearest-neighbor interactions are included,
however the social impact theory has also provided an ansatz, where the in-
teraction between each two agents can be considered in a weighted manner
(different from the mean field).
Within the framework of cellular automata different models of collective opin-
ion formation and group decision processes have been introduced, such as
ising-like models [7, 8, 42] or models based on a modified social impact the-
ory [14, 17, 18] that have been also applied to the coordination of individual
economic decisions [26]. Also sociological problems such as the formation of
support networks [10] have been simulated within an cellular automaton ap-
proach. The role of local information exchange has been further considered
within the framework of the Minority Game [4], where the emergence of rich
and poor spatial domaines could be shown [40]. Here, however, only nearest-
neighbor interactions have been taken into accout (more precisely, only inter-
actions with the left-hand neighbor in a linear chain model).
Taking into account the different perspectives on decision processes outlined
above, we may conclude the following requirements for a modeling approach:
It should be (i) an agent-based approach that allows to simulate individ-
ual decisions, (ii) a spatial model that takes into account physical distances
between agents, but (iii) is not restricted to nearest-neighbor or mean-field
interaction. Further it should allow (iv) a heterogeneous spatial distribution
of both agents and information and (v) an explicite modeling of information
exchange. Regarding the decision process, the model should take into accout
(vi) the influence of information locally available to the agent (instead of a
common knowledge assumption), (vii) strategic elements such as imitation
that go beyond the calculation of a private utility.
In the next section, we want to propose an agent model, that is novel in the
sense that it meets all of the requirements listed above – at least to some
extent – and is further simple enough to serve as a toy model for investi-
gating spatial effects in decision processes both analytically and by means of
computer simulations.
As we will show, this model describes the emergence of a majority and a mi-
nority of agents making the same decision (Sect. 3). But besides the existence
of a global majority, there are regions that are dominated by the minority,
hence a spatial coordination of decisions among the agents occurs (Sect. 4).
The main result of this paper, however, is not just the observation of the
clustering of opinions, which is a pervasive feature of a wide range of models
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– although in economics this phenomenon is very often described only on
the aggregated (macro) level, but not on the (micro) level of the agents. In
this paper, we derive conditions (Sect. 4) under which – for the same given
parameters – a large variety of possible spatial decision patterns can be found,
and the outcome of the decision process becomes certainly unpredictable, both
with respect to the share of the majority and to the spatial distribution.
We further show how the exchange of information affects the possibility of a
broad range of spatial decision patterns (Sect. 5). In particular, we discuss
how “efficient” information exchange provides a suitable way to stabilize the
majority status of a particular subpopulation – or to avoid “diversity” and
uncertainty in the decision process (Sect. 5).
2 Toy Model of Communicating Agents
Let us consider a 2-dimensional spatial system with the total area A, where
a community of N individuals exists. In general, N can be changed by birth
and death processes but A is assumed fixed. In a more abstract sense, each
individual i shall be treated as an agent, i.e. a rather autonomous entity which
is assigned two individual parameters: its position in space, ri, which should be
a continuous variable, and its current “opinion”, θi (with respect to a definite
aspect or problem). The latter one is a discrete valued parameter representing
an internal degree of freedom (which is a rather general view of “opinion”).
To be more specific, let us discuss for instance the separate disposal of recy-
clable material. Each agent in the system needs to decide whether she will
cooperate in the recycling campaign or defect. Then, there are only two (op-
posite) opinions, i.e. θi ∈ {+1,−1}, or {+,−} to be short. {+} shall indicate
the cooperating agent, and {−} the defecting agent.
From the classical economic perspective, the agents’ decision about her opinion
may depend on an estimate of her utility, i.e. what she may gain compared
to her own effort, if she decides to cooperate or not. Here, we neglect any
question of utility and may simply assume that the agent will more likely
do what others do with respect to the specific problem, i.e. she will decide
to cooperate in the recycling campaign if most of her neighbors will do so,
and defect if most of their neighbors have the same opinion in this case. This
type of herding behavior in decision processes – a special kind of the imitation
strategy – is well known from different fields, as discussed in Sect. 1.
This example raises the question about the interaction between agents at
different locations, i.e. how is agent i at position ri affected by the decisions
of other agents at closer or far distant locations? In a checkerboard world,
commonly denoted as cellular automaton, a common assumption is to consider
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only the influence of agents, which are at the (four or eight) nearest neigbour
sites or also at the second-nearest neighbor sites, etc. Contrary, in a mean-field
approximation, all agents are considered as influencial via a mean field, which
affects each agent at the same time in the same manner.
Our approach will be different from these ones in that we will consider a con-
tinuous space and a gradual, time delayed interaction between all agents. We
assume that agent i at position ri is not directly affected by the decisions of
other agents, but only receives information about their decisions via a commu-
nication field generated by the agents with the different opinions. This field is
assumed a scalar multi-component spatio-temporal field hθ(r, t), which obeys
the following equation:
∂
∂t
hθ(r, t) =
N∑
i=1
si δθ,θi δ(r − ri) − kθhθ(r, t) + Dθ∆hθ(r, t). (1)
Every agent contributes permanently to this field with her personal “strength”
or influence, si. Here, δθ,θi is the Kronecker Delta indicating that the agents
contribute only to the field component which matches their opinion θi. δ(r−ri)
means Dirac’s Delta function used for continuous variables, which indicates
that the agents contribute to the field only at their current position, ri.
The information generated this way has a certain life time 1/kθ, further it can
spread throughout the system in a diffusion-like process, where Dθ represents
the diffusion constant for information exchange. We have to take into account
that there are two different opinions in the system, hence the communication
field should also consist of two components, θ = {+1,−1}, each representing
one opinion. Note, that the parameters describing the communication field,
si, kθ, Dθ do not necessarily have to be the same for the two opinions.
The spatio-temporal communication field hθ(r, t) is used to reflect some im-
portant features of communication in social systems:
(i) the existence of a memory, which reflects the past experience. In our model,
this memory exist as an external memory, the lifetime of which is determined
by the decay rate of the field, kθ.
(ii) an exchange of information in the community with a finite velocity. It means
that the information will eventually reach each agent in the whole system,
but of course at different times.
(iii) the influence of spatial distances between agents. Thus, the information
generated by a specific agent at position ri will affect agents at a closer
spatial distance earlier and thus with larger weight, compared to far distant
agents.
The communication field hθ(r, t) influences the agent’s decisions as follows: At
a certain location ri agent i with e.g. opinion θi = +1 is affected by two kinds of
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information: the information hθ=+1(ri, t) resulting from agents who share her
opinion, and the information hθ=−1(ri, t) resulting from the opponents. The
diffusion constants Dθ determine how fast she will receive any information,
and the decay rate kθ determines, how long a generated information will exist.
Dependent on the information received locally, the agent has two opportunities
to act: she can change her opinion or she can keep it. A possible ansatz for
the transition rate to change the opinion reads [34]:
w(−θi|θi) = η exp
{
−hθ(ri, t)− h−θ(ri, t)
T
}
; w(θi|θi) = 0 (2)
The probability to change opinion θi is rather small, if the local field hθ(ri, t),
which is related to the support of opinion θi, overcomes the local influence of
the opposite opinion. Here, η defines the time scale of the transitions. T is a
parameter which represents the erratic circumstances of the opinion change,
based on an incomplete or incorrect transmission of information. Note, that T
is measured in units of the communication field. In the limit T → 0 the opinion
change rests only on the difference ∆h(ri, t) = hθ(ri, t)− hθ′(ri, t), leading to
“rational” decisions (cf. also [7]), i.e. decisions that are totally determined by
the external information. In the limit T →∞, on the other hand, the influence
of the information received is attenuated, leading to “random” decisions. We
note that T can be also interpreted in terms of a “social temperature” [17, 18],
i.e. it is a measure for the randomness in social interaction.
For N = const., the community of agents may be described by the time-
dependent canonical N -particle distribution function
P (θ, r, t) = P (θ1, r1, ..., θN , rN , t), (3)
which gives the probability to find the N agents with the opinions θ1, ..., θN
in the vicinity of r1, ...., rN on the surface A at time t. The time depentent
change of P (θ, r, t) is then given by the following master equation [44]:
∂
∂t
P (θ, r, t) =
∑
θ′ 6=θ
[
w(θ|θ′)P (θ′, r, t)− w(θ′|θ)P (θ, r, t)
]
(4)
Eq. (4) describes the “gain” and “loss” of agents with the coordinates r1, ..., rN
due to opinion changes, where w(θ|θ′) means any possible transition within
the opinion distribution θ′ which leads to the assumed distribution θ. Eq.
(4) together with eqs. (1), (2) forms a complete description of our system,
which depends on the parameters describing the agent density, i.e. N , A,
and the components of the communication field, si, kθ, Dθ. In order to find
possible solutions of the master equation, we will use computer simulations,
and in particular apply the stochastic simulation technique [6, 33]. But before
investigating the spatially distributed system, we first will discuss a mean-field
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approximation, in order to get some insight into the complex dynamics of the
agent system.
3 Mean-Field Approach
In this section, we will neglect any spatial effects of the agents distribution
and the communication field. This case, which has been discussed in more
detail also in [34], may have some practical relevance for communities existing
in small systems with short distances between different agents. In particular,
in such small communities a very fast exchange of information may hold, i.e.
spatial inhomogenities in the communication field are equalized immediately.
Thus, in this section, the discussion can be restricted to subpopulations with
a certain opinion rather than to agents at particular locations.
Let us define the share xθ of a subpopulation θ and the respective mean density
n¯θ in a system of size A consisting of N agents:
xθ(t) =
Nθ(t)
N
; n¯θ(t) =
Nθ(t)
A
(5)
where the total number of agents sharing opinion θ at time t fulfils the condi-
tion
∑
θ
Nθ(t) = N+(t) +N−(t) = N = const. ; x+(t) = 1− x−(t) (6)
In the mean-field approach, the communication field hθ(r, t) can be approxi-
mated by a mean value h¯θ(t) which obeys the following dynamic equation:
∂h¯θ(t)
∂t
= −kθh¯θ(t) + sθn¯θ (7)
Here, we have assumed that agents with the same opinion θ will have the same
influence si → sθ. We note that the case of a “strong leader”, where one agent
has a personal strength sl much larger than the usual strength si has been
discussed in [16, 18, 34].
The dynamic equation for the size of subpopulation θ can be derived from eq.
(4) in the mean–field approximation as follows [34]:
x˙θ = (1− xθ) η exp(a)− xθ η exp(−a) ; a =
[
h¯θ(t)− h¯−θ(t)
]
/T (8)
Via ∆h¯(t) = h¯θ(t)− h¯−θ(t), this equation is coupled to eq. (7).
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Let us now investigate the possible existence of stationary states, x˙θ = 0,
h˙θ = 0. For the two field components we find from eq. (7) with n¯ = N/A:
h¯stat+ =
s+
k+
n¯x+ ; h¯
stat
− =
s−
k−
n¯(1− x+) (9)
Let us for the moment assume that the parameters of both field components
are identical, i.e. s+ = s− ≡ s, k+ = k− ≡ k, a more complex case will be
discussed in Sect. 5. Then, the value a, eq. (8), which depends on the difference
between the field components, can in the stationary limit be expressed as:
a = κ
(
x+ − 1
2
)
with κ =
2s n¯
k T
(10)
The parameter κ plays the role of a bifurcation parameter that includes the
specific internal conditions within the community, such as the population den-
sity, the individual strength of the opinions, the life time of the information
generated or the randomness T . Combining eqs. (8), (10), the condition for
stationary solutions can be expressed by means of a function L(x, λ) and
κ = λ/2 as
L(x+, 2κ) = 0 (11)
where x ∈ (0, 1) and L(x, λ) is defined as:
L(x, λ) := ln x
1− x − λ
(
x− 1
2
)
(12)
0 1 2 3 4 5
κ
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
x +
1
st
at
Fig. 1. Stationary solutions for x+ (eq. 11) for different values of κ. The bifurcation
at the critical value κc = 2 is clearly visible. For κ = 2.66 that is used for some
of the computer simulations, we find in the mean field limit the stationary values
x+ = 0.885 and x+ = 0.115 for the majority and the minority status, respectively.
In [34] we found that, depending on κ, different stationary values for the
fraction of the subpopulations exist (cf. also Fig. 1). For κ < 2, x+ = 0.5
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is the only stationary solution, which means a stable community where both
opposite opinions have the same influence. However, for κ > 2, the equal
distribution of opinions becomes unstable, and a separation process towards
a preferred opinion is obtained, where x± = 0.5 plays the role of a separatrix.
Then, two stable solutions are found where both opinions coexist with different
shares in the community, as shown in Fig. 1. Hence, each subpopulation can
exist either as a majority or as a minority within the community. Which of
these two possible situations is realized, depends in a deterministic approach
on the initial fraction of the subpopulation. For initial values of x+ below the
separatrix, 0.5, the minority status will be most likely the stable situation, as
shown in [34].
The share of the majority or minority for a given value of κ > 2 can be im-
plicitely calculated from eq. (11). The critical value for κ where the bifurcation
occurs is determined by eq. (11) together with:
∂L(x+, 2κ)
∂x+
∣∣∣∣∣
x+=1/2
= 4− 2κ := 0 (13)
which results in κc = 2. From this condition we can derive by means of eq.
(10) a critical population size,
N c = k AT/s, (14)
where for larger populations an equal fraction of opposite opinions is certainly
unstable. We note that this critical value has been derived based on a mean
field analysis and therefore does not consider finite size or discrete effects.
If we consider e.g. a growing community with fast communication, then both
contradicting opinions are balanced, as long as the population number is small.
However, for N > N c, i.e. after a certain population growth, the community
tends towards one of these opinions, thus necessarily separating into a majority
and a minority. Note that eq. (14) for the critical population size can be also
interpreted in terms of a critical social temperature, which leads to an opinion
separation in the community. This has been discussed in more detail in [34].
From Fig. 1, we see further, that the stable coexistence between majority
and minority breaks down at a certain value of κ, where almost the whole
community shares the same opinion. From eq. (11) it is easy to find that
e.g. κ ≈ 4.7 yields xθ ≈ {0.01; 0.99}, which means that about 99% of the
community share either opinion +1 or −1. For smaller values of κ, for instance
for κ = 2.66, we find x+ = 0.885 for the majority status, and x+ = 0.115 for
the minority status respectively. Of course, due to the symmetry between both
opinions, the opposite relation, x+ = 0.115 and x− = 0.885 is possible with
the same probability. Which one is realized may depend on the fluctuation
during the early stage of the evolution of the agent system. Fig. 2 shows a
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particular realization obtained from computer simulation of 400 agents who
at t = 0 are randomly assigned one of the opinions {+1,−1}.
100 101 102 103 104
t
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
x θ
Fig. 2. Computer simulation of the relative subpopulation sizes x+ (✸) and x−
(◦) vs. time t for a community of N = 400 agents. Parameters: A = 400, s = 0.1,
k = 0.1, T = 0.75, i.e. κ = 2.66. Initially, each agent has been randomly assigned
opinion +1 or −1. The dashed lines indicate the inital equal distribution (xθ = 0.5)
and the minority and majority sizes (xθ = {0.115; 0.885}) which follow from eq.
(11).
100 101 102 103 104
t
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
h− θ
(t)
Fig. 3. Components h+ (✸) and h− (◦) of the mean communication field vs. time
t for the simulation shown in Fig. 2. After the initial time lag t⋆ ∼ 5/k = 50, both
field components evolve differently.
As indicated in Fig. 2, there is a latent period in the beginning before the
minority/majority relation emerges, i.e. during this period it is not clear which
one of the two subpopulations, the cooperators or the defectors will gain the
majority status. This initial time lag t⋆ can be roughly estimated as t⋆ ∼
5/k = 50 [36], where k is the decay constant of the field. t⋆ is needed to
establish the communication field, as shown in Fig. 3. With the same set of
parameters, both components of the communication field at first evolve in
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the same manner. However after the initial time lag, a selection in favor of
one of the components occurs which then breaks the symmetry between both
opinions. Hence, the communication field plays the role of an order parameter
as known from synergetics [9]. Consequently, for t ≥ t⋆, a transition from the
unstable equal distribution between both opinions toward a majority/minority
relation is clearly visible in Fig. 2. The time period to eventually establish this
relation is then rather short, since the case discussed in this section is related
to a very fast exchange of information.
Eventually, we want to point out that the symmetry between the two opin-
ions can be broken due to external influences on the agents. In [34] we have
considered two similar cases: (i) the existence of a strong leader in the commu-
nity, who possesses a strength sl which is much larger than the usual strength
s of the other individuals, (ii) the existence of an external field, which may
result from government policy, mass media, etc. which support a certain opin-
ion with a strength sm. The additional influence sext := {sl/A, sm/A} mainly
effects the mean communication field, eq. (7), due to an extra contribution,
normalized by the system size A. We found within the mean-field approach
that at a critical value of sext, the possibility of a minority status completely
vanishes. Hence, for a certain supercritical external support, the supported
subpopulation will grow towards a majority, regardless of its initial popu-
lation size, with no chance for the opposite opinion to be established. This
situation is quite often realized in communities with one strong political or
religious leader (“fundamentalistic dictatorships”), or in communities driven
by external forces, such as financial or military power (“banana republics”).
4 Spatial Information Dissemination
4.1 Results of Computer Simulations
The previons section has shown within a mean-field approach the emergence
of a minority/majority relation in the agents community. With respect to the
example of the recycling campaign adressed in the beginning, it means that
either most of the agents decide to cooperate or most of them defect.
The question remains how the cooperators and the defectors organize them-
selve in space by means of a spatial dissemination of information. In order to
consider the spatial dimension of the system explicitely, let us start with the
previous example of N = 400 agents randomly distributed in a system of size
A (cf. Fig. 4), with random initial opinions. They get information about the
opinions of other agents by means of the two-component communication field
hθ(r, t), eq. (1), which now explicitely considers space and therefore “diffu-
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sion” of information. The two-dimensional system is here treated as a torus,
i.e. we assume periodic boundary conditions.
In this section, we assume again that the parameters decribing the communi-
cation field, are the same for both components, i.e.
s+ = s− ≡ s ; k+ = k− ≡ k ; D+ = D− ≡ D (15)
a different case will be investigated in Sect. 5. Fig. 4 shows three snapshots
of the spatial distribution of the cooperators and the defectors, while Fig. 5
shows the respective evolution of the subpopulation shares. Evidently, we find
again the emergence of a majority/minority relation – this time however, on
a larger time scale compared to Fig. 2, which is basically detemined by the
information diffusion, expressed in terms of D. But the initial latent time lag
for the emergence of the majority/minority relation is about the same, which
is needed again to establish the communication field.
As the different snapshots of Fig. 4 show, the minority and majority organize
themselve in space in such a way that they are separated. Thus, besides the
existence of a global majority, we find regions in the system which are dom-
inated by the minority. From this we can conclude a spatial coordination of
decisions, i.e. agents which share the same opinion are spatially concentrated
in particular regions. With respect to the example of the recycling campaign
this means that those agents who defect to cooperate (or cooperate in the
opposite case), are mostly found in a spatial domain of a like-minded neigh-
borhood. This result might remind on the famous simulations of segregation
in social systems [10, 29, 30] - however, we would like to note that in our case
the agents do not migrate toward supportive places; they rather adapt to the
opinion of their neighborhood based on the information received.
The spatial distribution of the majority and the minority is also reflected in
the different components of the communication field, as shown in Fig. 6. We
find that the maxima of both components are of about equal value, however,
the information generated by the majority, is roughly spread over the whole
system, whereas the information generated by the minority eventually con-
centrates only in specific regions dominated by them.
Running the simulations of the agent system different times with the same
set of parameters but just different initial random seeds, reveals an interesting
effect that can be observed in Fig. 7, in comparison to Fig. 5. We see that
instead of a single fixed majority/minority relation for the spatially extended
system a large range of such relations exist, which even in the presence of fluc-
tuations are stable over a very long time. This means on the other hand that
under certain conditions the global outcome of the decision process becomes
hard to predict.
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Fig. 4. Computer simulations of the spatial distribution of cooperators (✸ left
column) and defectors (◦ right column). The snapshots are taken at three different
times: (a) t = 100, (b) t = 102, (c) t = 104. For the parameters and initial conditions
see Fig. 2, additionally D = 0.06.
The different global majority/minority relations further correspond to differ-
ent spatial coordination patterns. Fig. 8 gives a snapshot of the spatial distri-
bution of collaborators and defectors of a much larger system, but with the
same parameters as in Fig. 4 (in particular with the same average density of
agents). We see that in this case the majority and the minority are of about
the same size. Further, the minority no longer exists rather isolated (cf. Fig.
4c), but in a spatially extended domain. We note that besides some stochastic
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Fig. 5. Relative subpopulation sizes x+ (✸) and x− (◦) vs. time t for the computer
simulation shown in Fig. 4.
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Fig. 6. Spatial distribution of the two-component communication field: (top)
h+(r, t), (bottom) h−(r, t) at time t = 10
4, which refers to the spatial agent distri-
bution of Fig. 4c.
fluctuations the observed coordination pattern remains stable also in the long
run (t = 5 · 104).
Thus, we may conclude from these simulations that the spatially extended sys-
tem – under certain conditions – possesses multiple attractors for the collective
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Fig. 7. Relative subpopulation sizes xθ vs. time t from 20 computer simulations with
the same set of parameters as in Fig. 4, but different initial random seeds.
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Fig. 8. Snapshot of the spatial distribution of cooperators (✸ left) and defectors (◦
right) at t = 5 · 104. System size A = 1600, total number of agents N = 1600, for
the other parameters see Fig. 4. In this particular realization, the frequency of col-
laborators is x+ = 0.543 and the frequency of defectors is x− = 0.456, respectively.
dynamics that makes the outcome of the decision process hard to predict. This
holds not only for the global minority/majority ratio, but also for the possi-
ble spatial patterns that correspond to the different attractors. This shall be
discussed in more detail in the following section.
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4.2 Analytical Investigation of the Two-Box Case
In order to get more insight into the attractor structure of the spatially ex-
tended system, we want to investigate analytically the most simple spatial
case, consisting of only two boxes. The frequency to find agents with opinion
+1 in box i ∈ {1, 2} shall be denoted by yi+, whereas the frequency in the
total system is still given by x+ = N+/N , eq. (5). With a total system area A
and an assumed homogeneous distribution of agents with an average density
n¯ = N/A, it yields:
yi+=
Ni+
N/2
= 1− yi− ; i = 1, 2 (16)
x+=
1
2
(y1+ + y2+) (17)
h h1-1+
A/2 N/2 A/2 N/2
2+(1-y    )
h2-h2+D
1+1+y y2+(1-y    )
Fig. 9. Sketch of the two-box system indicating the different variables.
Fig. 9 gives an overview of the relevant variables of the two-box system. The
dynamics is described by six coupled equations, which read explicitely:
y˙i+=(1− yi+) η exp
[
hi+ − hi−
T
]
+ yi+ η exp
[
−hi+ − hi−
T
]
; i = 1, 2
h˙i+=−k+hi+ + s+n¯yi+ +D+8 (hj+ − hi+)
A
; i, j ∈ {1, 2} ; i 6= j
h˙i−=−k−hi− + s−n¯(1− yi+) +D−8 (hj− − hi−)
A
(18)
The stationary solutions of the set of equations follow from y˙i+ = 0; h˙i+ =
h˙i− = 0. Combining the six equations of eq. (18) in the stationary case, we
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arrive after some transformations at the following two conditions:
ln
(
y1+
1− y1+
)
+ ln
(
y2+
1− y2+
)
= 2
(
y1+ + y2+
) [
s+n¯
k+T
+
s−n¯
k−T
]
− 4 s−n¯
k−T
ln
(
y1+
1− y1+
)
− ln
(
y2+
1− y2+
)
= 2
(
y1+ − y2+
)
×
×

 s+n¯
k+T
(
1 +
16D+
Ak+
)−1
+
s−n¯
k−T
(
1 +
16D−
Ak−
)−1 (19)
The coupled equations of eq. (19) define the possible stationary frequencies
y1+, y2+ of agents in the two coupled boxes and therefore serve as a starting
point for a subsequent bifurcation analysis. It will be convenient to assume
first the parameters of the different field components as equal again, cf. eq.
(15). In this case, we can recover the bifurcation parameter κ, eq. (10) of the
mean field limit as follows:
κ=
s+n¯
k+T
+
s−n¯
k−T
=
2 s n¯
k T
(20)
By means of the previously defined function L(x, λ), eq. (12) we are now able
to express the conditions for stationary solutions, eq. (19) in the following
compact form:
F1+ :=κ(1− D¯) (y2+ − y1+) + L(y2+, 2κ) = 0
F2+ :=κ(1− D¯) (y1+ − y2+) + L(y1+, 2κ) = 0 (21)
where
D¯ =
(
1 +
16D
Ak
)−1
(22)
If we compare eq. (21) with eq. (11) for the mean-field case, we find that
each solution x+ of the mean-field case is also a solution of eq. (21) by setting
y1+ = y2+ = x+. Moreover, if D = 0, i.e. no exchange between the two boxes,
then D¯ = 1, and eq. (21) reduces to eq. (11).
The coupled equations (21) have been solved numerically, further we have
conducted a stability analysis. The corresponding bifurcation diagram is shown
in Fig. 10 for a single box (top) and the total system (bottom). If we compare
the latter one with the bifurcation diagram of the mean field limit, Fig. 1,
we find that the bifurcation at κc = 2 is obtained again, cf. curve (a). That
means, for κ < κc, the equal distribution of both opinions is the stable state
also for the spatially heterogeneous system, while for κ > κc a majority and a
minority emerges, which organizes itself in space in the way shown in Fig. 4.
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Fig. 10. Stationary solutions for yθ (top: single box) and xθ (bottom: total system)
resulting from eq. (21) for different values of κ. Parameters: A = 400, D/k = 6.0.
The solid lines indicate stable solutions, the dashed lines instable ones.
With increasing κ, we find a second bifurcation, curve (b) at the critical value
κc2. For consistency, the first critical value shall be denoted as κ
c
1 ≡ κc = 2.
As long as κc1 < κ < κ
c
2, the minority/majority ratio is clearly defined by
just one possible value, cf. Fig. 10(bottom). For κc2 < κ, however there are
different stable majority/minority relations possible in the system. This can
be also clearly observed in Fig. 11 that shows the stable and instable stationary
states of the 2-box system for three different values of κ.
The appearence of the second bifurcation curve (b) in Fig. 10(bottom) can
be understood when looking at the bifurcation diagram of a single box at
the top part of Fig. 10. To avoid confusion, the critical bifurcation values
of the single box are indicated by ′ instead of c. In the single box, the first
bifurcation is found at κ′1 = κ
c
1 = 2 as in the mean-field case, and a second
bifurcation at κ′2 > κ
c
1. The resulting new stationary states, however still
lead to an average frequency xθ = 0.5 in the total system, because of y1+ =
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Fig. 11. Stationary solutions for y1+ vs. y2+ resulting from eq. (21). (left)
κ′1 < κ = 2.1 < κ
′
2, (middle) κ
′
2 < κ = 2.6 < κ
′
3, (right) κ
′
3 < κ = 3.0. Other
parameters see Fig. 10. The filled circles mark stable states, the open squares in-
stable ones. The dashed lines are used to indicate possible separatrices.
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Fig. 12. Stationary solutions for y1+ vs. y2+ resulting from eq. (21) for κ=3.0 and
D/k=0, i.e. D¯=1. This figure should be compared to Fig. 11(right), whereD/k=6.0.
1 − y2+ in this particular case. Only after a third bifurcation in the single
box that occurs at the critical value κ′3 = κ
c
2, we find stationary frequencies
in each box that do not automatically sum up to 1, and therefore allow for
different frequencies for the total system. That means, in order to know about
the possible appearence of different majority/minority relations in the 2-box
system, we have to concentrate on the appearence of the third bifurcation for
the single box.
Eventually, we also investigate how the different critical bifurcation values κ′i
shift with the scaled diffusion constant D/k. The numerical results are shown
in Fig. 13. While κ′1 remains constant, κ
′
2 increases linearly with D/k, and κ
′
3
increases in nearly linear manner.
At least for the linear dependence, the shift of κ′ with D/k can be derived
analytically. As Fig. 10(top) shows, the first two bifurcations occur for yi+ =
1/2. Looking e.g. at box i = 1, we find for F1+, eq. (21): F1+ (y1+ = 1/2) = 0.
The dependence κ′(D¯) results then from the condition:
∂F1+
∂y1+
∣∣∣∣∣
y1+=1/2
= 0 (23)
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Fig. 13. Change of the critical bifurcation values κ′i (i=1,2,3) for a single box de-
pendent on D/k (cf. also Fig. 10 top).
This eventually leads to a quadratic equation for κ′(D¯):
D¯ κ′
2 − 2(1 + D¯) κ′ + 4 = 0 (24)
with the two solutions
κ′1 = 2 ; κ
′
2 =
2
D¯
= 2
(
1 +
16D
Ak
)
(25)
which agree with the results of Fig. 13.
We note that all three bifurcations keep existing also in the limit D/k → 0,
until the bifurcation values κ′i coincide at D/k = 0. The diffusion between
the two boxes of course affects the values of the κ′i, as shown in Fig. 13, but
the values of the stable states are not changed much. This can be seen by
comparing Fig. 11(right) with Fig. 12 valid for D/k = 0, that clearly indicates
how the size of the attractor regions around the stable states is influenced by
diffusion. In the limit of D/k → ∞ the situation of the mean-field limit is
recovered again.
In conclusion, the investigation of the two-box case has shown that above a cer-
tain critical value κc2 = κ
′
3 the possibility of different stable majority/minority
ratios exist. For a given supercritical population density, cf. eq. (14), the ve-
locity of information exchange, expressed in terms of the diffusion constant D
and the life time of information k determine whether these multiple attractors
can exist.
These results can be also adapted to the spatially extended “multi-box” case
as an approximation of the continuous space. If for the single box multiple
attractors exist, we can observe in the multi-box case a larger variety of spatial
coordination patters, with different patches of likeminded agents coexisting
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(cf. Fig. 8). Regarding the possible values of the minority/majority ratio for
the total system, we note that in the spatially extended system almost every
value can be realized. These multiple stable states for the total system can
be envisioned as a combination of the different possible stable states of the
single boxes. An increase of the diffusion constant of the information field, on
the other hand, restricts the stability of multiple attractors of the single boxes
and this way limitates the variety of possible spatial coordination patterns.
5 Information Dissemination on Different Time Scales
From the investigations in the previous section, we found the emergence of
different majority/minority relations in a spatially extended agent system.
So far, however, fluctuations during the initial time lag observed may decide
whether the cooperators or the defectors will appear as the majority. If we
start from an unbiased initial distribution, i.e. an equal distribution between
both opinions, then there is no easy way to break the symmetry towards e.g.
cooperation, except, an external bias is taken into account.
In this section, we will investigate a possibility to break the symmetry by
means of different information dissemination, i.e. we may exploit the different
properties of the information exchange in the system, as expressed in terms
of the parameters sθ, kθ, Dθ of the communication field. For instance, we may
assume that the information generated by of one of the subpopulations is
distributed faster in the system than the information generated by the other
one. Alternatively, we may also consider different life times of the different
components of the communication field. However, in order to model a faster
exchange of information, it is not sufficient to simply increase the value of Dθ,
we need to consider its effect on the local values of the communication field
in more detail.
Eq. (1) is known as a reaction-diffusion equation. In order to elucidate the
influence of the different parameters, we will assume for the moment a one-
dimensional system with the spatial coordinate x. Further, there shall be only
one group of N agents, θ = 0, which are located at the same place, x = 0 and
have the same personal strength, s0. Then, eq. (1) can be simplified to:
∂
∂t
h0(x, t) =
s0N
A
δ(x− 0)− k0 h0(x, t) + D0∆h0(x, t) (26)
Initially, h(x, 0) = 0 yields. After a certain time which depends in particular
on D0, the communication field h0(x, t) generated by the agents will reach a
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stationary distribution. With h˙(x, t) = 0 and n = N/A we find from eq. (26):
hstat0 (x) =
s0n
2
√
k0D0
exp

−
√
k0
D0
|x|

 (27)
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Fig. 14. Stationary distribution hstat0 (x), eq. (27), of the communication field, as-
sumed that there is only one group of N agents located at the same place, x = 0.
(−−−−) D0 = 0.06, (−−) D0 = 0.12, other parameters: N = 10, A = 1, s0 = 0.1,
k0 = 0.1.
Eq. (27) is plotted in Fig. 14 for two different parameters of the diffusion con-
stantD0. Obviously, in addition to the time scale of information dissemination,
an increase of D0 mainly affects the stationary value of the communication
field hstat0 (x) at the position of the agents, x = 0. I.e. a faster communication
in the system via a faster diffusion of the generated information, also lowers
the information available at the agent’s position. This might be considered as
a drawback in modeling information exchange by means of reaction-diffusion
equations. Obviously, the field hθ(r, t) obeys certain boundary conditions and
conservation laws, which do not hold for “information per se”. In particu-
lar, the local value of available information is not lowered if this information
spreads out faster, but the local value of the “communication field” obeying
eq. (1) does.
In order to compensate the unwanted effect of a local decrease of hθ(r, t), the
production rate sθ can be increased accordingly, which however effects again
the stationary values. To be consistent, we have to choose that both the ratios
kθ
sθ
= β; ;
Dθ
sθ
= γ (28)
need to be constant for both components θ = {+1,−1}. In this case, eq. (1) for
the dynamics of the multi-component communication field can be rewritten
23
as:
∂
∂τ
hθ(r, τ) =
N∑
i=1
δθ,θi δ(r − ri) − β hθ(r, τ) + γ ∆hθ(r, τ). (29)
where the time scale τ is now defined as τ = t (Dθ/γ). If both parameters β
and γ are kept constant, eq. (29) means that the dynamics of the respective
component of the communication field occurs on a different time scale τ ,
dependent on the value of Dθ. An increase in the diffusion constant Dθ then
models indeed the information exchange on a faster time scale as expected,
without affecting the stationary distribution resulting from eq. (29).
The effect of the different diffusion constants can be understood by means
of computer simulations, where the parameters β and γ, eq. (28) are kept
constant and only the ratio
d =
D+
D−
(30)
is varied. Fig. 15 shows the evolution of the subpopulations in time for d = 1/3
and d = 1 for comparision. Two features can be noticed from these two par-
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Fig. 15. Relative subpopulation sizes x+ (✸) and x− (◦) vs. time t. Parameters:
A = 400, N = 400, β = 1, γ = 0.6, (a) D+ = 0.02, D− = 0.06, (b) D+ = D− = 0.06
(cf. Fig. 5).
ticular runs: (i) For d = 1/3, the initial time lag when the decision which sub-
population becomes the majority is yet pending, has vanished. I.e. compared
to d = 1, there is a considerably reduced period of time for early fluctuations
to break the symmetry toward one of the subpopulations. The time lag has
been related before to the establishment of the communication field needed to
provide the coupling between the agents. But here we see that the symmetry is
broken very fast, even without a fully established communication field. (ii) For
d = 1/3, the subpopulation with the faster (more “efficient”) communication
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has become the majority, while for d = 1 both subpopulations have an equal
chance to become the majority in the system. These conclusions however need
some substantiation, therefore we have conducted more extensive computer
simulations presented in the following.
Fig. 16 shows the total fraction of agents of subpopulation {−1} over time av-
eraged over 20 runs, for different values of d. This mean value gives an estimate
of the chance that subpopulation {−1} becomes the minority or majority in
the system. We find that for d = 1 this chance is about 50 percent, i.e. only
random events decide about its status, as long as the information dissemina-
tion of both subpopulations occurs on the same time scale. With increasing
d (i.e. with an increasing information diffusion of the other subpopulation),
the trend towards a minority status clearly increases for subpopulation {−1},
as shown in the average fraction 〈x−〉. Already for d = 1.5, i.e. for example
D+ = 0.06, D− = 0.04, the average subpopulation fraction reaches a constant
minimum value in the stationary limit, which means that deviations in size
have considerably decreased.
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Fig. 16. Relative subpopulation size 〈x−〉 averaged over 20 runs. The different
numbers give the value of d = D+/D−. Other parameters see Fig. 15.
A closer inspection is given in the series of Fig. 17, which shows the mean
values of 〈x−〉 together with the minimum and maximum values of the 20
runs to indicate the scattering.
We find that for d ∈ {1.1; 1.2}, inspite of the clear tendency towards the mi-
nority status, there are still possibilities that the subpopulation {−1} ends
up as the majority in the system – even with a slower communication. With
increasing d, theses possibitities vanish, as Fig. 17 (c,d) indicate. However,
for a range of d ∈ {1.2; 1.4} we find that the size of the minority population
still shows a large range of possible values. Only for d > 1.5, these deviations
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Fig. 17. Relative subpopulation size 〈x−〉 averaged over 20 runs (cf. Fig. 16) together
with minimum/maximum values. (a) d = 1.1, (b) d = 1.2, (c) d = 1.3, (d) d = 1.5.
Other parameters see Fig. 15.
become small enough to allow only one stable size of the minority subpopula-
tion.
Considering the results for possible attractors in the spatially extended sys-
tem obtained in the previous section, we can discuss the outcome of the above
simulations also from a different perspective. They allow to distinguish be-
tween two different stationary regimes: (i) a multi-attractor regime, where
different values for a stable minority/majority ratio are possible, and (ii) a
single-attractor regime, where only one stable minority/majority ratio exists.
In the considered case, the crossover between these two regimes can be ob-
tained by an increase/decrease of the ratio d = D+/D−, provided a subcritical
population density and constant values of β and γ, eq. (28) are fulfilled. The
effect of an increasing diffusion coefficient of one subpopulation – or a more
efficient communication, respectively, can be understood similar to the two-
box case, Sect. 4.2. There we have shown that larger values of D decrease the
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attractor basins of some stable states for the single boxes, and thus reduce the
possibility of multiple stable states for the total system.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we have investigated the coordination of decisions in a spatially
distributed agent community. The interaction between the agents is described
by a scalar, multi-component communication field that stores the information
about the agents’ decisions. This spatio-temporal field is assumed to obey a
reaction-diffusion equation. This way, memory effects are modeled by means
of a limited lifetime of the information, whereas the exchange of information is
modeled by means of a finite diffusion coefficient. Dependent on the different
information received at her particular position, each agent makes a decision in
a binary choice problem. I.e. she chooses either {+} or {−} after comparing
the local information available.
From analytical investigations of the mean-field case, we found that the sub-
populations of agents making a particular choice coexist at different shares
within the community. They can be found either as a majority or a minority,
provided some internal conditions (such as a supercritical population density)
are fulfilled.
In this paper, we are mainly interested in how the majority and the minority
of agents emerge in a spatially heterogeneous system and how they organize
themselves in space. We observed that the formation of minority/majority
subpopulations goes along with a spatial separation process, i.e. besides the
existence of a global majority, there are regions that are dominated by the
minority. Hence, a spatial coordination of decisions among the agents occurs.
Further, we found that – different from the mean-field case – a large range
of possible global minority/majority relations can be observed that refer to
different spatial coordination patters. We have investigated analytically and by
means of computer simulations, under which conditions these multiple steady
states occur and stable exist. The results can be concluded by looking at the
two influencial parameters of the model, κ and D.
κ includes the specific internal conditions within the agent community, namely
the population density n¯, the production rate of information per agent s, the
lifetime of information k and the randomness T that can be envisioned as
a measure of the incompleteness or incorrect transformation of information.
Defining ν = sn¯/k as the net information density, κ = 2ν/T describes the
relation between the mean information ν available at any location and its
efficiency ∼ 1/T – in other words, the impact of the information produced. We
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recall that the limit T → 0 means a large impact of the available information
leading to “rational” decisions, whereas in the limit T →∞ the influence of
the information is attenuated, leading to “random” decisions.
In order to gain at least some impact of the available information, a supercriti-
cal value of κ > κc = 2 is needed. In this case the emergence of a minority and
a majority within the agent community can be observed, whereas for κ < κc
only random decisions occur. To allow multiple steady states in the spatially
extended system instead of just one fixed minority/majority relation, κ has
to be κc < κc2 < κ, where κ
c
2 itself is increasing with the diffusion constant
D. Then a variety of possible spatial decision patterns can be found, and the
outcome of the decision process becomes certainly unpredictable, both with
respect to the share of the majority and to the spatial distribution.
This means that the spatial couplings, expressed in terms of D, are not large
enough to globally organize the system. Since κ characterizes the average local
situation in a spatially extended system in terms of a net information den-
sity, this can be also interpreted in a way that the impact resulting from the
information exchange does not overcome the impact resulting from the local
information production.
For values of κ below κc2(D), however, these local effects become smaller,
and the spatial couplings are able to organize the whole system. Thus only
one minority/majority relation occurs on the global level, which relates to
randomly different, but very similar spatial patterns.
If we put these results in the context of a social system, we could conclude
that strong local influences, expressed in a high information impact, can pre-
vent the global system from being equalized and “globalized” by some ruling
information. While such a diversity might be among the wanted effects, we
note again that this on the other hand makes the system difficult to predict.
Eventually, we have addressed in this paper the influence of information ex-
change on different time scales. In particular, we have assumed that one of
the two subpopulations communicates faster – or more efficient – than the
other one, and have investigated how this affects the global outcome of the
decision process. Dependent on the ratio d = D+/D− of the two diffusion
constants we found (i) a tendency that the subpopulation with the faster
communication more likely becomes the majority, and (ii) that the possibility
of multiple steady states tends to vanish with an increasing/decreasing d. In
conclusion, “efficient” information exchange provides a suitable way to stabi-
lize the majority status of a particular subpopulation – or to avoid “diversity”
and uncertainty in the decision process.
Finally, we want to add that the toy model of communicating agents inves-
tigated in this paper may be easily modified or extended to describe other
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processes. Without giving up the whole framework, we may consider e.g.
other types of information dissemination in the system, i.e. eq. (1) for the
communication field may be replaced – for example by a more network-type
communication among the agents. Another possible modification is regarding
the decision process described in this paper by means of eq. (2). Here, we may
envision various dependences on the information received from likeminded or
opponent agents.
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